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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
PlaintiftfAppellee, : Case No. 960507-CA 
v. : 
BETTY BASTA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of aggravated arson, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995); and insurance fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
l.(A) Is reversal warranted where, despite the State's failure to disclose details of a 
plea bargain between itself and one of its expert witnesses in an unrelated matter, 
defendant discovered the plea agreement well before trial, obtained copies of the police 
reports and docket sheet, extensively questioned the witness about the plea at trial, and, 
only after a guilty verdict was rendered, approached the trial court to seek relief from the 
discovery violation? 
The appellate court must determine as a matter of law whether a discovery 
violation occurred and, if so, must review the trial court's ruling on the discovery issue 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 916-18 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 687 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant waived appellate review of 
his claim of a violation of state discovery rules by failing to take appropriate steps below 
to mitigate any potential prejudice from the alleged discovery violation. State v. Kallin, 
877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 882-83 (Utah 1988); 
Mickelson. 848 P.2d at 691. 
(B) Did the prosecutor commit reversible error when he implied in closing that the 
expert had no bias arising from the plea he entered in an unrelated matter, consistent with 
the testimony the expert gave on the stand? 
When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court will reverse the 
conviction only if the prosecutor's statements are improper and prejudicial. State v. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 786 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Is reversal warranted where a section of electrical wiring disappeared after the 
fire marshal had inspected it but before any other expert could inspect it, given the fact 
that the fire marshal rejected the wiring as a possible cause of the fire, and two of the 
2 
remaining three experts also ruled out the wiring as a possible cause of the fire based on 
other evidence gleaned in their on-site inspections? 
Appellate review of this issue is governed by the review stated in issue 1, supra, 
for a discovery violation. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issues presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief, 
including: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1995); and 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1995); and insurance fraud, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1995) (R. 6-9) (copies of these statutes are 
attached in addendum A). Following a four-day trial, a jury convicted her as charged (R. 
92, 95-98, 141-42). Defendant filed two post-trial motions for arrest of judgment or for a 
new trial, arguing that the State failed in its duty to preserve certain wiring, that the State 
failed to disclose the details of a plea agreement it had in an unrelated criminal matter 
involving one of its witnesses in this case, and that the State knowingly relied on 
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allegedly perjured testimony about the plea agreement (R. 152-77). Following a hearing 
and arguments, the trial court denied the motions and ordered defendant to undergo a 60-
day evaluation (R. 205, 211-14, 1068, 1087-88) (a copy of the verbal rulings is attached 
in addendum B). Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for 
five-years-to-life for aggravated arson, and one-to-fifteen years for insurance fraud, 
stayed the concurrent sentences, and put defendant on thirty-six months probation (R. 
240-41). Defendant timely appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which poured the case 
over to this Court by order dated July 31, 1996 (R. 267). 
New counsel appeared for defendant on appeal and sought a temporary remand 
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 23B, seeking to supplement the record on claims 
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (R. I l l 1-28). This Court granted the remand, 
and an evidentiary hearing was held on July 7, 1997 (R. 1151-52). The trial court found 
no evidence to support the various claims of ineffective assistance (R. 1153-56), and the 
issues addressed on remand have not been raised in defendant's brief. Aplt.'s Br. at 7. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 9:37 a.m. on Saturday, February 11, 1995, a fire crew was dispatched to fight 
an active residential fire at 916 Peach Blossom in Sandy, Utah (R. 333-34). The home 
was a split-level home, and the fire had blown out windows in the front of the house and 
generated a heavy plume of smoke visible to the firefighters before they arrived (R. 334-
35, 365-66). Two crews immediately advanced through the front doors with hoses, one 
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of which headed upstairs (R. 336).l David Durrant led his crew to the lower level where 
he manned the nozzle of their hose (R. 336, 364, 366-67). They were greeted by blinding 
smoke and billowing heat (R. 366, 378). Durrant reached the bottom of the stairs, 
shooting bursts of water in front of him in order to see the next few steps (R. 365, 367). 
Upon reaching the bottom level, he discovered that the bulk of flame was to his left (R. 
367). Believing that the main fire was burning in a closet under the stairs, he turned his 
hose on that area, only to find that the fire in that area was a "quick, hot fire" which 
"knocked down just instantly as soon as I hit it with a little bit of water." (R. 369-70). He 
noted at trial that the studs in the closet had started scorching but "were not really far 
involved," that it took only "a couple quick squirts" to douse the fire, and that the stairs 
which formed the ceiling of the closet "were very solid" and had not been structurally 
undermined by the fire in the closet (R. 369, 373, 376, 380). 
Durrant rapidly discovered that the "seat" or the heart of the fire was four-to-eight 
feet into the family room, which shared a common wall with the closet (R. 368-72, 376, 
381, 387).2 The fire in the family room was "f[u]rther involved" than the one in the 
lfThe difficulty defendant notes with a hose involved only the crew fighting the fire 
on the upper level (R. 383). The hydrant problem caused no delay in fighting the fire 
because the crews "had plenty of water in the engine" which they used while others 
relayed water from a second hydrant (R. 383-84). Further, the hydrant worked fine a day 
earlier when defendant's husband used it (R. 764-65). 
2The east wall of the closet was the west wall of the family room (R. 381, 505, 
701-02). That wall was of 2 x 4 construction with sheetrock and wood paneling on the 
family room side only (R. 381, 387). Two floor plans are attached in addendum C. 
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closet, and took twenty to thirty minutes of hard fighting before the firefighters could 
claim any kind of control (R. 368-70, 385-86). The crew put out fire burning on several 
cardboard boxes in the middle of the room on the floor and noted numerous other 
cardboard boxes around the perimeter of the room, consistent with defendant's claim that 
the room had stored numerous boxes of home decorating items at the time of the blaze (R. 
378, 386, 425, 500, 772). 
Once the fire was extinguished, Durrant took time to examine the scene, largely 
for safety reasons (R. 380). Based on his experience with the fire, his review of the depth 
of char3 in various parts of the lower level, his observations of the damage and bum 
patterns, and his extensive training and experience, he determined that the fire burned 
from the family room toward the closet and the stairwell (R. 370-80).4 
Sandy City Fire Marshal Dave Meldrum arrived on the scene around 10:30 a.m. 
(R. 403, 407-08). His responsibility was to investigate the fire and determine both cause 
and origin (R. 407). In doing so, Meldrum was trained to assume that the fire was an 
accident and then to proceed to examine all possible accidental causes to see if they could 
be excluded as causes in this instance (R. 414). Meldrum noted that most of the damage 
3Char is the burnt residue resulting from flame and heat impinging on an object (R. 
753-54). 
4Durrant explained that the depth of char in the closet "was not near as great" as 
that in the family room immediately above where he believed the seat of the fire to be (R. 
372, 380). 
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was confined to the basement family room (R. 409). However, one-half hour into his 
investigation, he was informed that there had been a fire the previous afternoon (R. 409-
10). Around 2:30 p.m. on Friday, defendant's husband Robert Basta had discovered 
smoke and flames in the closet under the stairs (R. 760-61). Instead of calling the fire 
department, he retrieved a garden hose from the back yard, attached it to a fire hydrant 
outside, and poured a sufficient amount of water into the closet to soak the contents and 
to warp the top of the closet door (R. 563, 764-66, 787). The fire had started and burned 
on the west side of the closet opposite the wall shared with the family room (R. 760-61, 
778). Mr. Basta hauled the damaged items into the back yard (R. 346). 
With this information in mind, Meldrum concentrated on the closet, specifically 
thinking about the possibility that the Friday closet fire had rekindled to cause the 
Saturday fire (R. 409, 417-18).5 He looked at the items burned in the Friday fire and 
determined that the fire was small-Mr. Basta confirmed as much (R. 417-18, 554-55). 
He examined the closet carefully, noting that there were still numerous items in the closet 
which remained unburned after the Saturday fire but would likely have been totally 
consumed had the fire begun in the closet, and that the stairwell was not as heavily 
5
 While at the scene of the fire, Meldrum voiced an initial belief that the fire might 
be a rekindle of the Friday fire (R. 556-60, 588-89). However he did not finish his 
investigation of the fire until several days later, by which time he made his final 
determination that this was not a rekindle but was an intentionally-set fire (R. 416, 560, 
576). Such a change during the course of an investigation is normal (R. 580). 
7 
damaged as would be expected if the source of the fire was in the closet (R. 418-19). 
Meldrum spent VA to 2 hours examining the electrical system in the area of the fire, 
including removing part of the wiring from the common wall between the closet and the 
family room (R. 414-16,440-42, 595).6 However, he ultimately eliminated electricity as 
a cause of the fire, in part because he found the wiring to be pliable instead of brittle as it 
would have been had it caused the fire, and he saw nothing in the wiring to be 
inconsistent with having simply been exposed to the heat and flames which burned 
around it (R. 416, 440-42, 444, 569).7 
Ultimately, Meldrum eliminated all possible accidental causes, finding that the fire 
was intentionally set (R. 416-17, 421-22). He determined an "area" of origin, as opposed 
to a "point" of origin: between three and five feet from the west wall of the family room 
(R. 412-13). He felt the cause was likely a flame intentionally applied to items stored in 
the room, noting the complete absence of any indication of an accelerant having been 
6Meldrum removed the wiring from the common wall to more closely examine it, 
and ultimately left it on a blue garbage can in the basement (R. 444, 595). Defendant's 
twenty-three-year-old son testified that he saw Meldrum and another fireman put the 
wiring in a fire truck (R. 756, 806). 
7Defendant claims that the State's witnesses put the origin of the fire "on the floor 
of the basement family room directly in front of a common wall shared with the stairwell 
closet." Aplt.'s Br. at 9. However, he makes this statement in the middle of a paragraph 
talking about the Friday fire. IdL The evidence established that the Friday fire started in 
the closet near the floor on the wall opposite the common wall with the family room (R. 
760-61, 778). The prosecution's witnesses put the origin of the Saturday fire away from 
the common wall (R. 413, 748-49, 751, 875-76). 
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used (R. 423-25). He theorized that the fire traveled, in part, from its area of origin, 
through the family room door into the hallway, then attacked the door to the closet (R. 
419,433-34, 449, 513). Meldrum's investigation suggested that the fire approached the 
closet from outside, breaching it in two ways: 1) through the closed door, burning it from 
the top down; and 2) through the common wall, again burning from the top down (R. 419-
20, 427-28, 5200-21, 524-28). Meldrum's decision was based on the following factors: 
—various burn patterns and "V" patterns indicating the direction from which the 
fire came (R. 427-28, 433-34, 524); 
-the fact that the sheetrock remaining on the family room side of the common wall 
was not burned on the closet side (R. 429); 
—various damage to wood and screws in the common wall which was more 
noticeable on the family room side of the wall than the closet side (R. 445); 
—sheetrock remaining on the family room side of the common wall were not 
burned on the closet side (R. 429); 
-the remaining char was considerably deeper in the family room than in the closet 
(R. 447-48); 
—evidence that the fire in the closet was high, consistent with an in-progress fire 
breaching the room from another room (R. 433), and burned down toward the floor 
(R. 430-31); 
—the absence of evidence to be expected if this had been a rekindle from inside the 
closet, including the amount of damage to the closet-side of the 2 x 4fs, and the 
fact that the closet and stairs were as structurally sound as they had been before the 
fire (R. 430, 436-37); 
-the absence of damage to some items in the closet which should have been 
damaged if the fire originated there, including cardboard, a vacuum cleaner and its 
cord, and papers (R. 418-19,432-35); 
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—the fact that if the fire had started in the closet, he would expect to see a different 
pattern of burn than existed in the hall and around the family room door (R. 433-
34) and a different level of charring (R. 521). 
On February 14, 1995, Jerry Thompson arrived at the scene to investigate the 
cause and origin of the fire on behalf of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance 
Company (R. 829-30, 832). The passage of time since the fire and the fact that much of 
the debris and furniture had been removed, windows had been boarded up, and the fire 
department had completed their work on the site added various considerations to 
Thompson's job but did not make it impossible (R. 849-50, 873-74). There was still 
ample evidence remaining, and he was able to view and evaluate the scene over several 
days and determine the area of origin of the fire (R. 833, 837, 849-50, 873-74). He did 
not speak to Meldrum, to the fire department personnel, or to the other experts until after 
he had completed his review of the scene, thereby ensuring that he reached his own 
independent determination (R. 833-34, 850, 861, 874-75, 877-78). In Thompson's expert 
opinion, the physical evidence established that the "fire started near the front [of the 
family] room on the floor with possibly materials that was [sic] available at the time." (R. 
834-35, 837, 857). He determined that the fire in the closet was a light one, noting that 
there was very little bum evident in the closet except at the top where it would be 
expected (R. 836A, 867-69). 
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On February 18, 1995, Donald Peak arrived at the scene to investigate the origin 
and cause of the fire for CNA Insurance Company (R. 646-47, 649).8 Peak also avoided 
speaking to fire department personnel or Meldrum until after he completed an 
independent evaluation of the scene (R. 647-48). As his investigation developed and no 
accidental causes presented themselves, his suspicions grew (R. 650). He concluded his 
investigation by determining that the fire's area of origin was low in the southwest 
quadrant of the family room from "about center to the room" to the door, burned into the 
hallway, entered the closet by burning into the closed door from the top (R. 651-54, 669, 
672, 680, 699, 701-02, 748-49, 751). He determined that the fire also breached the 
common wall near the top, moving from the family room into the closet (R. 752-53). 
Numerous factors entered into this determination, including: 
—fire bum patterns showing that fire entered into the closet from outside (R. 663); 
—remaining sheetrock on the common wall that was unbumed on the closet side 
(R. 663); 
—clean, unburned wood in the lower part of the storage room (R. 652, 671), and no 
general low-level burning in the room (R. 652); 
—the heaviest damage was in the family room and in the hallway outside the 
family room, with moderate to heavy damage up the stairwell and moderate 
damage under the stairwell (R. 650-51); 
8Despite defendant's claim that Peak examined the scene "immediately following 
the fire," (Aplt.'s Br. at 11), Peak did not arrive until three days following the fire (R. 
333-34, 647). 
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-damage to the ceiling of the family room was heaviest by the door of the family 
room (R. 668-69); 
—the ceiling of the closet showed more damage than lower down (R. 671); 
—there was heavy damage on the exterior of the closet from the family room and 
from the hallway (R. 652, 663); 
—the absence of heavier damage that would be expected had the fire started in the 
closet (R. 652, 663-64, 672, 680). 
Aside from putting the origin of the fire in the same general area, all three experts 
found no concrete evidence of an accelerant (R. 423-24, 655, 835-36, 858), all believed 
the wiring was not involved as a cause (R. 585, 672-73, 837, 867, 875-76), and all three 
ruled out accidental causes (R. 414, 416-17, 655, 684-88, 836A-37, 863-65).9 
Additional facts are developed where appropriate in the following arguments.10 
9Peak sent samples from the scene to a lab for testing, but no evidence of 
accelerants was found (R. 655, 713). However, Peak himself used a mechanical device at 
the scene which indicated that there were hydrocarbons—and therefore evidence of an 
accelerant—in the area (R. 712). 
10The expert testimony in this case is the focus of the direct appeal. However, in 
addition to the expert testimony concerning cause and origin, the jury heard testimony 
about the severe financial trouble facing the Bastas (R. 461-63, 604-05, 610-11, 628-29, 
689, 724-26, 839-40), the numerous eviction attempts by the property owners (R. 618, 
622, 624, 627), the fact that defendant handled the family's finances (R. 757-58, 815), the 
fact that the entire family appeared ignorant of the financial situation except defendant (R. 
756-58, 760, 793-94, 815-16, 819), the confusing stories and comments made by 
defendant both before and after the fire (R. 457-60, 462-63, 623, 769, 814, 817), and the 
fact that defendant obtained a homeowner's insurance policy on the house five or six days 
before the fire and ten days after receiving the last eviction notice, despite her knowledge 
that, as renters, her family was not entitled to such a policy (R. 632-35, 769-70, 815, 882). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Although the prosecutor did not "specifically respond" to defendant's 
request for details of plea bargains reached between the State and any witnesses it 
intended to use at trial, defendant is not entitled to reversal based on the nondisclosure of 
details of a plea bargain reached between the State and one of its expert witnesses, David 
Meldrum, in an unrelated theft case. Although defendant discovered the charges prior to 
the preliminary hearing and intended to make use of the plea bargain to impeach 
Meldrum at trial, he failed to take any steps to mitigate any possible prejudice from the 
nondisclosure until after the jury rendered its verdict. Moreover, the information-
preserved post-trial in the form of a transcript of the plea hearing in the theft case-is 
neither constitutionally material nor reasonably likely to have affected the jury's 
judgment. 
Point II: Reversal is not warranted for destruction of the wiring located in the 
common wall between the closet and the family room because the wiring was neither 
constitutionally material nor clearly exculpatory. Dave Meldrum-the only expert to 
personally inspect the wiring—determined from his inspection of the wiring and of the rest 
of the fire scene that the wiring did not cause the fire. Both of the State's remaining 
experts were confident in reaching the same determination despite their inability to 
inspect the wiring. Defendant's expert voiced the sole contrary view based solely on 
photographs, which the jury rejected in the face of all the evidence surrounding the 
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missing wiring and defendant's closing argument stressing the importance of the wiring 
to a determination of the fire's cause. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TIMELY TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TO 
MITIGATE THE CLAIMED PREJUDICE OR TO INVESTIGATE THE PLEA 
BARGAIN UPON HER PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF IT PREVENTS 
CONSIDERATION OF THIS CLAIM; ALTERNATIVELY, SHE 
ESTABLISHES NO PREJUDICE, AND SHE FAILS TO PROVE THAT 
MELDRUM GAVE FALSE TESTIMONY, CONDEMNING HER RELATED 
CLAIM OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Defendant contends that the State violated her constitutional rights to a fair trial 
and to due process of law by failing to disclose to her prior to trial the details of its plea 
agreement with Dave Meldrum in an unrelated theft case against him. Aplt.'s Br. at 25-
26. She claims that Meldrum's testimony and his credibility were material to the case, 
and that the State's violation of its disclosure duty materially impacted on the 
proceedings, warranting a reversal. Id She also contends that when asked about the plea 
agreement at trial, Meldrum offered false testimony "that he had no deal with the State 
and that his testimony at trial against Mrs. Basta had nothing to do with the deal he 
received" in his theft case. Id at 26. Finally, she challenges the prosecutor's closing 
remarks in rebuttal which argued Meldrum's credibility as a witness. Id at 30. 
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The relevant chronology of events is as follows: 
Feb. 11, 1995 Meldrum investigates Basta fire immediately 
after it is extinguished (R. 407-08); 
April 6, 1995 The instant charges are filed against defendant; 
Meldrum knows at this point that he will be a 
witness for the State (R. 464-65); 
April 11, 1995 Defendant files a written discovery request 
seeking, among other things, the criminal record 
and existing plea bargain agreements for each of 
the State's witnesses (R. 14-16); 
April 26, 1995 Meldrum steals a trailer (R. 466); 
May 12, 1995 Meldrum is charged with third degree theft of 
the trailer (R. 178,469); 
May 1995 Meldrum is dismissed as Sandy City Fire 
Marshal because of the theft case (R. 465-66, 
591-92); 
May 1995 Defendant discovers a newspaper story that 
Meldrum was discharged as fire marshal 
because of the criminal case (R. 1077-78, 
1085); 
June 1, 1995 Defendant files a supplemental discovery 
request pertaining solely to Meldrum, but makes 
no mention of the theft charge (R. 23-24); 
June 20, 1995 Meldrum testifies at the preliminary hearing in 
this case (R. 19, 470, 1081); defendant cross 
examines him at length about the theft case (R. 
1077-78, 1081, 1085); 
July 20, 1995 Meldrum appears for a change of plea hearing 
in the theft case and enters a plea of ffno 
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contest" to be held in abeyance for one year (R. 
178,470-71,477,579); 
Defendant obtains a docket sheet of the theft 
case which reflects information about the plea 
(R. 178-79, 1074); 
After trial begins, the trial court grants 
defendant's verbal motion to use the plea 
bargain from the theft case to establish 
Meldrum's bias in the Basta case (R. 389-400, 
1087); 
Defendant cross-examines Meldrum in depth 
concerning the plea bargain reached in the theft 
case (R. 466-77, 1087); 
Defendant files her second of two post-
judgment motions to arrest judgment. This 
involves the State's alleged failure to disclose 
the details of the plea bargain in the theft case, 
and includes a partial transcript of the plea 
hearing (A copy of which is attached as 
addendum D)(R. 169-82). This is defendant's 
first notification to the trial court of the alleged 
discovery violation. 
A. Reversal Is Not Warranted Because Defendant Failed To Pursue All Reasonable 
Means To Mitigate The Claimed Prejudice, And Failed To Establish The 
Constitutional Materiality Of The Undisclosed Information 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor should have disclosed the details of the plea 
agreement pursuant to its written request because the information was relevant to 
Meldrum's credibility at trial and, therefore, was material to defendant's guilt or 
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innocence. Aplt.'s Br. at 25-26.11 She claims that the prosecutor's failure to disclose the 
information violated his responsibilities under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(4) 
and the federal constitution.12 
1. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 imposes upon the prosecutor various 
discovery responsibilities (a copy of the rule is attached in addendum E).13 In this case, 
the prosecutor candidly admitted that he "failed to specifically respond" to defendant's 
request for information as to plea bargain agreements between the State and any of its 
witnesses (R.201).14 
1
 Although defendant's brief notes that the prosecutor failed to disclose the theft 
charges, the existence of the plea, and the details of the plea agreement, Aplt.'s Br. at 19-
20, defendant's argument includes only the last point. Id. at 25-26. 
12Defendant also mentions the state constitution, but does not propose an analysis 
different from the federal analysis. See State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 710-11 (Utah 
App.) ("mere allusion to state constitutional claims, unsupported by meaningful analysis, 
does not permit appellate review"), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
13Defendant summarily claims that his request for information regarding offers of 
leniency made by the State to its witnesses is covered by subsection (a)(4), thereby 
automatically requiring a response from the State. Aplt.'s Br. at 24-25. Subsection 4 
involves information which tends to negate or mitigate defendant's guilt. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 16(a)(4). In contrast, defendant's request involves information pertaining solely to 
witness credibility. Such information is properly reviewed under subsection 5. State v. 
Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677, 688-89 (Utah App. 1992) (involving criminal records of State 
witnesses); see also State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987). 
14The record does not reflect how the prosecutor chose to respond to defendant's 
discovery request. To the extent the prosecutor should have disclosed the plea 
information prior to trial, his failure to do so was erroneous. However, when defense 
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However, the mere existence of a violation of rule 16(a) does not warrant reversal. 
Where a defendant fails to make use of alternative reasonable means to mitigate possible 
prejudice from a discovery violation or to investigate the facts of the case, his appellate 
claim of reversible error based on the discovery violation is extinguished. State v. Kallin, 
877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994) (one factor to be reviewed in addressing a claimed 
discovery violation is "the extent to which appropriate defense investigation would have 
discovered the omitted or misstated evidence"); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 
(Utah 1988); State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677, 691 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Christofferson. 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990); see also State v. Knight 734 P.2d 
913, 916 n.l (Utah 1987) (failure to properly request a court order under subsection (a)(5) 
"may be fatal to a claim based on the nondisclosure of evidence"). 
In this case, defendant had ample opportunity to mitigate possible prejudice from 
the nondisclosure, but failed to do so. No theft charges existed until more than one month 
after defendant made her original written discovery request in April. Defense counsel 
freely admitted that he learned of the criminal charges prior to the June preliminary 
hearing and cross-examined Meldrum about them at that hearing (R. 1077-78). Defense 
counsel inquired into the criminal charges at the preliminary hearing, then called the 
prosecutor before trial to say that he would use the plea agreement to establish bias at 
trial, and did not seek any further information about the plea agreement, it became 
apparent that counsel already knew the information he wanted. Thus, the prosecutor 
would have been justified in believing that there was nothing left to be disclosed. 
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counsel also filed a supplemental discovery request on June 1, asking for further 
information about Meldrum but making no mention of the theft charge (R. 23-24). 
Before the November trial, defense counsel obtained a copy of the docket from the theft 
case (R. 178-79, 1074), as well as copies of police reports and forged receipts used by 
Meldrum for the theft (R. 390, 400). Counsel also contacted the prosecutor prior to trial to 
inform him that defendant intended to use the plea bargain to impeach Meldrum's 
credibility at trial (R. 1085). Defense counsel thereafter conducted a lengthy and thorough 
cross-examination at trial into the facts of the theft case and the plea bargain entered into 
by Meldrum (R. 466-77). The record reflects no effort by defendant either before or 
during trial to bring the discovery violation to the trial court's attention or to obtain from 
the State any clarification of the plea bargain once its existence was known. Instead, 
defendant chose to wait until after the jury rendered a verdict before she subpoenaed the 
tape of the plea hearing in the theft case and told the trial court about the discovery 
violation (R. 169-82, 1074-75). Defendant's failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate 
possible prejudice once she knew of the discovery violation or to undertake a reasonable 
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investigation prior to entry of a verdict defeats her claim of reversible error on appeal.15 
Kallin. 877 P.2d at 143; Mickelson. 848 P.2d at 691: Christofferson. 793 P.2d at 948. 
Further, reversal is not warranted unless the undisclosed information "may have 
had a significant impact upon the trial such that [its] nondisclosure constitutes prejudicial 
error." Mickelson. 848 P.2d at 691; see also Utah R. Crim. P. 30 (f,[a]ny error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded."). Because defendant establishes no such prejudice, see harmless error 
argument in subsection 2, infra, his claim of reversible error for a violation of rule 16 is 
without merit. 
2. The Federal Constitution 
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor's nondisclosure violated her 
constitutional due process rights. Different circumstances require application of different 
standards to such a claim. Defendant's arguments implicate two of those standards. 
First, defendant claims that the undisclosed evidence shows that the State's case 
involved perjured testimony (i.e., that Meldrum "testified that he had no deal with the 
1
 defendant's decision not to timely pursue the plea information despite her intent 
to rely on the information for impeachment of what she terms a "key" State's witness at 
trial verges on invited error. See State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987) 
("'invited errorf is procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially where 
ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such result"); State v. Smith. 776 P.2d 929, 
932 (Utah App. 1989) ("defendant cannot lead the court into error by failing to object and 
then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions"). 
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State and that his testimony at trial... had nothing to do with" the deal he reached with 
the State in the theft case), and that the prosecutor knew it. Aplt.'s Br. at 26-34. In this 
situation, the conviction will be set aside only if there is "'any reasonable likelihood that 
the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'" Codianna v. Morris. 
660 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Utah 1983) (quoting United States v. Agurs. 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 
S.Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976)). 
Second, defendant claims that the State had a duty to respond to the written pretrial 
request for plea bargain information. Aplt.'s Br. at 22-26. In this situation, the 
nondisclosed evidence must be both favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or 
punishment before reversal is warranted. Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 
1194, 1196 (1963); State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Utah 1986). However, a 
defendant must establish more than mere evidentiary materiality: he must establish 
"constitutional materiality." Agurs. 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S. Ct. at 2401-02; State v. 
Nebeker. 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983); State v. Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 926 (Utah 
App. 1990). To establish constitutional materiality, defendant must show "'that the 
suppressed or destroyed evidence is vital to the issues of whether the defendant is guilty 
of the charge and whether there is a fundamental unfairness that requires the Court to set 
aside the defendant's conviction.5" Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 926 (quoting State v. Lovato. 
702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985)). In other words, there can be no violation of a disclosure 
duty unless the omission is of sufficient significance to result in a denial of defendant's 
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right to a fair trial. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S. Ct. at 2399-400. The mere possibility 
that the undisclosed evidence might have affected the trial's outcome does not establish 
constitutional materiality. Shaffer. 725 P.2d at 1305. The nondisclosed material must be 
reviewed in the context of the entire record, and reversal is not warranted if there is no 
reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt whether or not the material is considered. 
Agurs. 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S. Ct. at 2402 (finding the victim's prior criminal history 
not to be material). 
Defendant's claim fails under either of these standards because: 1) the plea 
transcript fully supports Meldrum's testimony; and 2) the undisclosed information, as 
established by the transcript, is not constitutionally material because, even assuming it 
affected Meldrum's credibility, there was sufficient evidence concerning the cause and 
origin of the fire without consideration of Meldrum's testimony to support the verdict. 
Codianna. 660 P.2d at 1108 (where the withheld evidence was tangential or cumulative 
and the record contained overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, reversal was not 
appropriate). 
a. Meldrum's testimony comports with the plea agreement 
The undisclosed information, as established in the plea transcript, is fully 
consistent with Meldrum's testimony on cross-examination and adds nothing to 
defendant's attempt to impeach Meldrum. Amid questions detailing the facts behind the 
theft, the charge filed and the statutory sentence it carried, the charges that were possible 
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but were not filed, and the definition and details of the plea in abeyance, defense counsel 
cross-examined Meldrum, in relevant part, as follows: 
[Defense Counsel:] When you testified against [defendant] at the preliminary 
hearing, you hadn't had this deal yet; isn't that right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. They hadn't extended this offer to you? 
A. No. 
Q. You knew if you testified against her [at the preliminary hearing] in a way that 
would help the State make its case, that you might receive some favorable 
treatment, such as this deal from the District Attorney's office; isn't that right? 
A. Counsel, that's ludicrous. 
Q. It's ludicrous? 
A. It's offensive. 
Q. You're to cooperate with the State as part of your plea to make sure that the 
charges are dismissed? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. It's not true? 
A. Absolutely not true. 
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Q. You see no connection between the deal that you were offered and your 
testimony in this case, Mr. Meldrum? 
A. Your question was whether or not part of the deal was that I was to 
cooperate with the State. 
Q Do you see any connection^] Mr. Meldrum -
A. I do not. 
Q. - between your testimony in this case and the deal that you received? 
A. None whatsoever. 
Q. Do you see any connection, Mr. Meldrum, in respect to your testimony in 
this case and the charges against you being dismissed outright? 
A. Absolutely not. 
(R. 473, 477) (the exchange is fully set forth in addendum F). This exchange establishes 
that: 1) Meldrum did not testify favorably for the State at the preliminary hearing out of 
any subjective belief it might result in a favorable plea bargain in the theft case;16 2) 
Meldrum was not required by the terms of the plea bargain to cooperate with the State to 
ensure that the theft charge was ultimately dismissed; and 3) Meldrum did not himself 
perceive any connection between his plea bargain and his trial testimony. 
A transcript of the preliminary hearing is not included in the record. 
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As to the first point, defendant's implication at trial that Meldrum lied at the 
preliminary hearing in order to obtain a beneficial plea bargain is without support. 
Neither defendant nor the plea transcript establishes that a plea bargain was being 
considered at the time of the preliminary hearing, let alone that Meldrum knew of any 
such possibility. In fact, the prosecutor below noted that plea discussions began only 
after the preliminary hearing in this case (R. 200). Instead, the record shows that 
Meldrum never asked the prosecution about favors or favorable treatment (R. 1080-81). 
The terms of the plea bargain later offered to Meldrum give no insight as to the 
motivation behind his preliminary hearing testimony, which testimony was fully 
consistent with the cause and origin conclusions reached by Meldrum the week after the 
fire-nine weeks before he took the trailer (R. 576-78, 1079-80, 1082). 
Regarding the second point, neither defendant nor the plea transcript establishes 
that Meldrum was required to testify favorably for the State in this case in order to have 
his theft charge ultimately dismissed. In the transcript, the prosecutor in the theft case 
noted that Meldrum was involved as a witness in several pending arson cases and that the 
State intended to prosecute those cases with Meldrum's "cooperation" (R. 180). 
Addendum D. Defendant interprets this as meaning that Meldrum's cooperation in the 
other cases was part of the plea bargain in the theft case. However, the prosecutor was 
merely giving necessary factual background before explaining that the "no contest" plea 
resulted from the State's concern about attempts to impeach Meldrum in the felony cases 
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with the theft plea (R. 180-81). Addendum D. In context, the exchange establishes that 
the State acted out of its unilateral concern for potential impeachment, not a concern that 
Meldrum's favorable testimony needed to be insured.17 The consistency of Meldrum's 
trial testimony with his preliminary hearing testimony and with his earlier cause and 
origin determinations after the fire further suggests that neither Meldrum's appearance 
nor his testimony in the various arson cases was in question, and that the specter of 
impeachment was the State's sole concern in its formatting of the theft plea (R. 577-78, 
1082).18 This comports with Meldrum's responses to defense counsel's cross-
examination. 
Moreover, the State's reasons for reducing the charge—that the plea was handled in 
the same manner as any case, without any agreement or consideration of Meldrum's 
performance in the pending felony cases-are amply supported and were expressly 
explained to Meldrum through his counsel (R. 201, 472, 1080-81). Meldrum had no prior 
criminal history, the trailer was returned to its owner without damage within 24 hours of 
17Defendant's insinuations about the plea being conditioned on the prosecutor's 
agreement not to charge other possible crimes is purely speculation on defendant's part 
and has no record support. 
18The State's concern was valid, as evidenced by defendant's argument below that 
the plea information was admissible for impeachment under Utah Rule of Evidence 609 
(R. 391-94). The State's strategy was valid as well, inasmuch as the trial court denied 
admission of the evidence under rule 609 (R. 399-400). However, the trial court ruled 
that it was admissible to the extent it related to witness bias under rule 608 (id.). 
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being taken, and, because of the criminal charge, defendant lost his job of 17 years (R. 
201,578-79,1080-81). 
As to the third point, defendant did not ask if there was a connection between the 
trial testimony and the plea bargain: he asked if Meldrum subjectively saw any such 
connection. The plea colloquy does not establish Meldrum's subjective view of the plea 
bargain. As Meldrum did not seek any special treatment from the State, and was 
cognizant of the State's reasons (noted above) for entering the plea, he may well have 
viewed the plea bargain as being independent of his testimony in this or any other case. 
Neither does the plea colloquy establish a connection between the plea bargain and 
Meldrum's testimony from an objective point of view: it shows only the State's 
preoccupation with Meldrum's possible impeachment. 
The plea transcript fully supports Meldrum's responses establishing that he was 
not testifying because of an agreement with the State, leaving no false testimony to affect 
the jury's judgment. Codianna, 660 P.2d at 106. Further, nothing in the plea transcript 
rises to the level of constitutional materiality in the context of this record. Pre-trial 
disclosure of the information in the transcript would have had no impact on Meldrum's 
responses to defense counsel's questions and would not have established what defendant 
sought to suggest: that the content of Meldrum's testimony derived, not from fact, but 
from Meldrum's desire to take care of his criminal charge. Accordingly, reversal is not 
warranted, and defendant's claim fails. 
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b. Harmless error 
Even assuming, arguendo, that pre-trial disclosure would have destroyed 
Meldrum's credibility, there was sufficient other evidence relating to the cause and origin 
of the fire to support the convictions.19 That evidence included the testimony of two more 
experts for the State and an expert for defendant. None of the remaining experts were 
able to personally examine the missing wiring (see Point 2, infra). However, unlike 
defendant's expert, who relied solely on photographs in generating his opinion, both 
State's experts conducted on-scene investigations. They went out of their way to ensure 
their investigations were independent, and they reached the same conclusions as Meldrum 
regarding the cause and origin of the blaze, providing detailed explanations of the bases 
for their conclusions.20 As the jury necessarily rejected the cause and origin testimony of 
defendant's expert in reaching the verdict, it is not reasonably likely that the jury would 
have credited his testimony had Meldrum been fully impeached. 
Add to this the testimony of David Durrant, who was the lead firefighter on the 
team that battled the fire in the basement. His observations and conclusions, made during 
and after the battle with this fire and based on years of firefighting experience, fully 
19Meldrum's testimony related primarily to cause and origin. Defendant has not 
challenged the testimony of the other witnesses, which established the other requisite 
elements for the charged crimes. 
20Exhibit 19, on which the experts marked their "area of origin" is inexplicably 
absent from the record on appeal. However, the prosecutor represented below that all the 
State's experts indicated the same area of origin (R. 1027-28). 
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support the cause and origin determinations made by Peak and Thompson (see pp. 5-6, 
supra). Consequently, even if defendant's interpretation of the plea agreement were 
correct, and defendant had received the information in time to fully impeach Meldrum at 
trial, there was sufficient evidence remaining to support the jury's cause and origin 
determination beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1108 (there is no 
due process violation by withholding evidence when the evidence was tangential or 
cumulative and did not create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt in the context of a 
record which has more than sufficient evidence of guilt). 
B. Because Meldrum Gave No False Testimony About The Theft Plea, The 
Prosecutor's Closing Argument Asserting Meldrum's Credibility Did Not 
Constitute Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at least twice. 
First, he points to the prosecutor's closing remarks involving Meldrum's allegedly false 
testimony: 
Next, the Defense said, well, the reason you can't believe Meldrum is he's 
got an interest in the outcome of the case. He does? Did he get $2,000 to come in 
and testify like [defendant's expert]? I mean, there's a man who's no longer in the 
fire department. He could have just said, hey, forget it, forget it, I'm no longer 
there, I don't really care, but the fact that Meldrum comes in here and testifies and 
tells you the same thing that he concluded back in February says something about 
his integrity. It says something about the man. That was his call to make. That 
was his conclusion." (R. 1034) (a copy is attached in addendum G). 
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Aplt.'s Br. at 30-31. Second, he claims that the prosecutor "kept from the defense 
accurate information and truth [sic] about Meldrum's criminal history and plea bargain."21 
Id at 30. 
An appellate court will reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only if 
"the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Hay, 
859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993) (additional quotations omitted). 
Reversal is not warranted in this case. First, the closing remarks are not erroneous 
inasmuch as witness credibility was an appropriate subject for closing argument. State v. 
Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 853-54 (Utah App. 1992) (a prosecutor cannot vouch for a 
witness9 credibility but can comment on witness credibility to the extent the comment is a 
reasonable inference from the evidence), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Meldrum testified that the plea bargain in the theft case was not conditioned on his 
testimony in this case, providing evidence from which the prosecutor was able to make 
the challenged argument that he got no benefit from testifying in this case. 
21Defendant also alleges misconduct arising from the prosecutor's use of 
Meldrum's "false/perjured testimony". Aplt.'s Br. at 30. However, Meldrum did not 
"blatantly deny[]the truth of the plea bargain" as defendant claims. Meldrum did not 
deny the existence of the plea agreement, only that it was conditioned on his giving 
favorable testimony for the State in this case. As his testimony comported with the plea 
bargain (see Point IA(2), supra), there was no false testimony and, hence, no misconduct. 
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Second, even if the prosecutor had timely informed defendant of the details of the 
plea bargain as set forth in the transcript, and defendant was able to use that information 
to persuade the jury that Meldrum was an incredible witness, the evidence was such that 
there can be no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have entered a more favorable 
judgment for defendant. See harmless error argument in Point IA(2), supra. 
Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 
POINT II 
WHERE THE WIRING WAS NEITHER CONSTITUTIONALLY MATERIAL 
NOR CLEARLY EXCULPATORY, THE FACT THAT IT WAS PRESERVED 
ONLY IN PHOTOGRAPH FORM DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS 
Defendant contends that her due process and fair trial rights were violated by the 
State's failure to preserve the wiring and breaker panel box removed from the wall of the 
closet by Meldrum. Aplt.'s Br. at 34-44. However, there was no duty to preserve the 
evidence because it was neither constitutionally material nor clearly exculpatory.22 
22Elsewhere in her brief, defendant purports to challenge the State's failure to 
preserve the scene of the fire coupled with the prosecution's attack on defendant's expert 
for failing to examine the scene in person. Aplt.'s Br. at 17. However, no mention is 
made of this point in the body of defendant's written argument. Id. at 34-44. Hence, the 
issue is not properly before this Court and should not be reached on appeal. Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 150 (Utah App. 1997) (absent an argument 
as specified by rule 24(a)(9), the appellate court will not reach an issue). 
Even if the argument is reached, it fails absent any authority to impose on the State 
the burden of preserving the scene solely to prevent such an argument at a possible 
criminal trial. The law and professional ethics impose strict duties of good faith and 
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Where evidence material to the guilt or innocence of an accused in a criminal case 
is deliberately suppressed or destroyed, there is a denial of due process. State v. 
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 926 (Utah App. 1990). However, as with the claimed 
constitutional discovery violation in Point IA(2), supra, defendant is not entitled to a 
reversal unless he establishes the "constitutional materiality" of the destroyed evidence. 
State v. Nebeker. 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983); Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 926. This 
burden is not satisfied by showing a mere possibility that the evidence might have 
affected the trial's outcome. State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301, 1305 (Utah 1986). 
The State's duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that would be 
expected to play a significant role in the defense: the evidence must possess both an 
exculpatory value apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature 
that defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 
available means. California v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 492, 488-89, 104 S. Ct. 2533, 2534 
(1984); Salt Lake Citv v. Emerson. 861 P.2d 443, 448 (Utah App. 1993); see also Shaffer. 
disclosure on criminal investigators and state authorities, and the impracticalities 
associated with preservation of such a scene for an extended period of time dictate against 
the existence of such a duty. The scene was preserved in the most practical manner 
possible-photographs. The fact that defendant's expert had to rely on the photographs 
does not automatically render the witness incredible, but factors into the jury's weighing 
responsibilities. Moreover, defendant was free to point out to the jury that no scene 
remained for his expert to review-a fact he established in his post-trial motions (R. 218-
38). Absent persuasive authority for imposing such a burden on the State, his position 
fails. 
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725 P.2d at 1306-07 (the prosecutor must preserve incriminating and exculpatory 
evidence material to the case; the evidence must be preserved if it is reasonably apparent 
that the evidence potentially constitutes material evidence). 
Defendant claims that the constitutional materiality of the wiring and breaker box 
[hereinafter "wiring"] is established by a number of factors: the number of pictures 
Meldrum took before it was lost; the fact that it was a possible cause of the fire according 
to the State's own experts; the proximity of the wiring to the area of origin; the 
importance of the wiring's pliability and the inability of pictures to convey this fact; the 
fact that it was important enough to remove from the wall; the fact that Donald Peak 
noted in his report that it should be examined; and the determination by defense expert 
David Smith that char patterns showed it to be involved in causing the fire. Aplt.'s Br. at 
40-41. However, defendant's argument is not credible under the facts of this case. The 
evidence was not vital to defendant's guilt or innocence of the charges, and there was 
nothing which suggested to the State at the time the wiring was available that it would 
have exculpatory value in these proceedings.23 
Meldrum was the sole individual to examine the wiring, and he in fact preserved 
the wiring in the form of thirteen photographs (R. 530-31), all of which ensured careful 
23There is no dispute in the evidence that the wiring was actually in the fire: the 
question is whether it caused the fire. Even defendant's own expert, David Smith, could 
not determine from the mere existence of arcing and beading whether the wiring was a 
cause or a casualty of the fire (R. 915). 
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documentation of the location of and damage to the wiring. The photos demonstrate the 
care with which Meldrum reviewed the scene, not the importance of the evidence to the 
case. Moreover, if, as defendant claimed below, Meldrum was intent on destroying the 
evidence to fabricate an arson theory, common sense dictates that he would take few, if 
any, photographs of something he wanted no one to see. 
All the experts agreed that, in fire investigations where electrical wiring is present, 
the wiring could be a possible cause of the fire until it can be eliminated (R. 414, 672-73, 
684, 836-37, 914). After thorough investigation, Meldrum determined that the fire started 
on the floor of the family room, not on the common wall where the wiring was located 
(R. 412-13). He also found that the wire did not exhibit characteristics indicative of fire 
causation (R. 440-44, 585). Instead of being brittle, as it would be if it had caused the 
fire, the wiring was soft and pliable (R. 441). While pliability cannot be determined from 
the photographs (R. 569), it is but one of several factors to be considered in judging 
whether the wiring caused the fire or simply was consumed by the fire. As a result of his 
investigation, Meldrum eliminated the wiring as a cause of the blaze (R. 585).24 As he 
saw no exculpatory value in the wiring, he found no need to preserve it (R. 443-44, 585). 
24Defendant misinterprets Meldrum's testimony as being that the wiring and the 
breaker panel showed the fire was non-accidental. Aplt. Br. at 11, 25. Meldrum was 
clear that his elimination of the wiring as a cause of the fire was based not only on his 
physical examination of the wiring but on other factors as well, not the least of which was 
his determination that the area of origin was away from the wall where the wiring was 
located. 
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Although they did not inspect the actual wiring, the State's two remaining experts 
made similar determinations over the days following the blaze. Jerry Thompson was not 
concerned that the wiring was unavailable, nor did he try to determine its whereabouts (R. 
863, 866-67). The mere fact that it had been removed from the wall caused him no 
concern (R. 862-63, 867). In response to defense counsel's thorough questioning at trial, 
Thompson noted that his investigation of the scene made it obvious that he did not need 
to look at the actual wiring in order to eliminate it as a cause of the fire (R. 837, 867). He 
found that the entire wall on which the wiring had been located had nothing to do with the 
cause of the fire, and that the fire's origin was lower to the floor, away from the wall (R. 
875-86). Consequently, any information to be gleaned from the wiring was unimportant 
to his determination of cause and origin. 
Donald Peak similarly viewed the wiring as having no exculpatory value. While 
he would normally examine such wiring in the course of an investigation and noted in his 
report that he felt that the investigation would be more complete if the wiring could be 
inspected (R. 735; Defendant's Exhibit 53, p. 2),25 his inability to view the wiring caused 
him no concern because he was otherwise able to determine that electricity played no part 
in igniting the fire (R. 672-73, 695-96, 707, 748). His elimination of an electrical cause to 
25The report said "Elect[rical] taken by [fire department] needs to be examined." 
(Def s Exhibit 53, p.2; R. 735). Peak explained at trial that the entry did not mean that he 
needed to examine it but that someone should (R. 733-35). 
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this fire was based on statements from various individuals, bum patterns at the scene, his 
own examination of other electrical mechanisms, the absence of damage he would expect 
to see had the wiring been at fault, and the fact that the area of origin did not include the 
wall where the wiring had been located (R. 672-73, 696, 704, 707, 736-37, 748).26 
Even the jury rejected the suggestion that the wiring was a vital piece of evidence. 
The jury had before it the opinions of all four experts and rejected Smith's testimony 
suggesting that the wiring played an important part in the fire. The trial judge commented 
three times at sentencing that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
convict defendant, suggesting that he, too, was unpersuaded by Smith's suggestion (R. 
1100-01, 1103). This Court is being asked to rule that the wiring was vital to the defense 
based on no more evidence than was presented to and rejected by the trial judge and the 
jury. The argument is no more persuasive now than it was below. 
Where three experts in three independent investigations found no exculpatory 
value in the evidence, and the sole determination that the wiring might be involved in 
causing this particular fire was not made by defendant's expert until weeks after the 
26Defendant cites to Peak's initial notes of his investigation to claim that Peak 
believed the origin of the fire was in the "exact location" of the wiring Meldrum removed 
from the common wall. Aplt.'s Br. at 12. This statement becomes meaningless in view 
of Meldrum's testimony that he took out all the wiring from inside the stairwell closet (R. 
440). Further, Peak explained at trial that while the fire may have originated "on or near" 
the common wall, it did not start inside the wall and did not begin with the wiring (R. 
703-07). Instead, he said it started low to the floor away from the wall (R. 748-49). 
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wiring had disappeared, whatever exculpatory value the wiring had, if any, could not be 
said to be readily apparent when the wiring was last seen shortly after the fire was 
extinguished. On this record, the wiring might have offered, at best, a mere possibility of 
evidence favorable to defendant. As such, the State was under no obligation to preserve 
it. Shaffer. 725 P.2d at 1306; Emerson. 861 P.2d at 448. 
Defendant theorizes that if something might conceivably be a possible cause of 
fire, it is foreseeable that evidence of that possible cause would play a "significant part in 
the suspect's defense" and that it should, therefore, be preserved. Aplt.'s Br. at 39, 40 
(quotation omitted). Carried to its logical conclusion in light of the uncontested 
testimony that fire investigators view all accidental sources of fire as a possible cause in 
any given fire until each source is eliminated, defendant's theory would require that the 
State preserve evidence of all possible causes of fire at every fire scene, including all 
wiring, furnaces, water heaters, appliances, fixtures, and similar items, regardless of the 
evidence the State may have suggesting they were uninvolved in causing any fire (R. 
414). Such a burden is unwarranted and unprecedented. See, e.g., Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 
1306 ("To require the prosecution to gather all 'relevant' exculpatory evidence before a 
suspect has been identified and before the State is notified of possible defenses, is to 
require the impossible."). 
Defendant adds that it is fundamentally unfair for the State to destroy the wiring 
then be permitted to challenge at trial the defense expert's conclusions because of his 
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reliance on photographs in lieu of inspecting the actual wiring. Aplt.'s Br. at 42-43. 
Aside from being unpersuasive, this reasoning fails because the prosecutor did not 
challenge Mr. Smith's failure to examine the wiring. It was made clear to the jury that 
the wiring was unavailable to everyone who entered the case after Meldrum's on-site 
investigation. The prosecutor challenged Mr. Smith's ability to make the ultimate cause 
and origin determination based solely on pictures and written documents (R. 994-95) 
(attached in addendum G). Even if the wiring had been preserved, the prosecutor's 
criticism of Mr. Smith's methods would remain viable because the wiring represents only 
one of many possible accidental causes of this fire, and the remainder of Mr. Smith's 
review of the cause and origin of this fire would still be based on photographs. 
Accordingly, the absence of the wiring does not establish a fundamental unfairness 
worthy of a reversal. 
Defendant has not established that the wiring was vital to the issue of her guilt or 
innocence, possessed an exculpatory value apparent at the time Meldrum inspected it, or 
represents any fundamental unfairness worthy of reversal. Consequently, the wiring is 
not constitutionally material, and defendant's claim of reversible error fails. 
POINT III 
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, this Court "will reverse only if 'the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was 
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had.'" State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). Because there are no multiple 
identifiable errors in this case, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply. Parsons v, 
Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 516 (Utah) (citing Bundv v. DeLand. 763 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 
1988) (additional citations omitted), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994); Rasmussen v. 
Sharapata. 895 P.2d 391, 392 n.l (Utah App. 1995). 
To the extent this Court disagrees and finds multiple errors, each of the errors 
constitutes harmless error, as argued in Points I and II, supra. Accordingly, this Court 
should determine that the cumulative effect of the harmless errors does not undermine 
confidence in the fairness of the trial. State v. Alonzo. 932 P.2d 606, 617 (Utah App.), 
cert, granted. 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / J ^ k a y of April, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
was mailed by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Richard G. Uday, attorney for 
appellant, 356 East 900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / T ^ f a y of April, 1998. 
40 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
76-6-103. Aggravated arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-103, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Destruction of school 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-6-103; 1986, ch. 59, i 2. property, { 76-8-715. 
76-6-521. False or fraudulent insurance act — Punish-
ment as for theft. 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent 
to defraud: 
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or 
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains 
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an appli-
cation for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, certificate, or 
contract; 
(b) presents, or causes to be presented, any oral or written statement or 
representation as part of or in support of a claim for payment or other 
benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, or in 
connection with any civil claim asserted for recovery of damages for 
personal or bodily injuries or property damage, knowing that the state-
ment or representation contains false or fraudulent information concern-
ing any fact or thing material to the claim; 
(c) knowingly accepts a benefit from proceeds derived from a fraudulent 
insurance act; 
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or artifice to 
obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d), is punishable as in 
the manner prescribed by Section 76-10-1801 for communication fraud for 
property of like value. 
(3) A corporation or association is guilty of the offense of insurance fraud 
under the same conditions as those set forth in Section 76-2-204. 
(4) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsections (l)(b) 
through (l)(d) shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or 
other things obtained or sought to be obtained by the fraudulent insurance act 
or acts described in Subsections (1Kb) through (l)(d). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-521, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote this sec-
1973, ch. 196, { 76-6-521; 1994, ch. 243, i 13. tion to such an extent that a detailed analysis is 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend* impracticable. 
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to do that and they're the ones that want it both ways in 
this particular case, Judge. 
The fact of the matter is that this wire was abso-
lutely critical. It should have been preserved. Everything 
that Mr. Meldrum did with respect to the wiring, every nota-
tion we have from Mr. Peak about the importance of and 
possible location of the scene of the fire indicates that 
this wire was a critical, material piece of evidence. It was 
material in the constitutional sense because no matter which 
way you cut it, Judge, it was material to the issue of guilt 
or innocence, and the fact that we're not dealing with mere 
possibilities here, we're dealing with very, very real 
evidence, your Honor, that shows that the wire was a very 
probable source of ignition of this fire. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Moffat. 
I'm of the view that the motion should be and 
therefore is denied for the reasons stated in the memorandum 
in opposition and the argument here of Counsel today. That 
issue was, in my judgment, my recollection of the evidence at 
trial, exhaustively gone into and the jury had the opportu-
nity to weigh and consider and concluded, unfortunately for 
the Defense, that Ms. Basta indeed was the guilty party. I'm 
going to deny that motion therefore. 
The next hearing in this matter will be Monday at 
1:30, at which time I will entertain your second motion to 
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1 have been examined by anybody, even Mr. Meldrum, and I relied 
2 on what Mr. Meldrum said in making my assessment. 
3 Your Honor, his testimony was key and his credibil-
4 ity about those things was absolutely essential. Maybe the 
5 jury didn't buy off on what we were saying about the rela-
6 tionship between Mr. Meldrum's plea and the testimony and 
7 that very well may be, but maybe, your Honor, and it's quite 
8 likely that the reason they didn't buy off on it is because 
9 we didn't have the information that was in the plea arrange-
10 ment to present to them to say look, he's lying. 
11 We would submit it, Judge. 
12 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Moffat. It is correct 
13 to state that the issue of Mr. Meldrum's prior difficulty 
14 with the law was brought to my attention on the morning of 
15 trial. In chambers Counsel and myself discussed at some 
16 length this question of the resolution of the Meldrum charge 
17 and I, over the objection of the State, determined that it 
18 would be appropriate to allow the jury as the final arbiter 
19 of the credibility of the witnesses to resolve the question 
20 of whether or not Mr. Meldrum was tainting his testimony by 
21 virtue of this transaction with the State. 
22 I My recollection of the trial at this point is that 
23 considerable cross-examination was engaged in of Mr. Meldrum. 
24 He did deny that the two circumstances had any connection, at 
25 I least to the extent that he would consider changing his 
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1 testimony. In other words, subjecting himself to potential 
2 of perjury. That was done over the objection of the State. 
3 The argument by counsel on both sides to the jury 
4 was that there had been a deal made and therefore, Meldrum's 
5 testimony should be discarded from the Defense perspective, 
6 and from the State's perspective that he was telling the 
7 truth, that even though he had been convicted of this, or at 
8 least had entered a plea of no contest to this other theft 
9 charge, that his testimony ought to be judged accordingly. 
10 I must presume and I believe it is the case that 
11 the jury heard the circumstances and rendered their judgment 
12 based upon their evaluation of the credibility of the respec-
13 tive witnesses, knowing the circumstances behind 
14 Mr. Meldrum's prior criminal charge, and accordingly, for the 
15 reasons specified in the memorandum in opposition, 
16 Mr. Moffat, I'm compelled to deny your motion to arrest judg-
17 ment and/or for new trial. 
18 Having now ruled in this matter, I am of the view 
19 we must proceed with the sentencing as Ms. Basta is in 
20 custody and it's, I'm sure, a matter of considerable interest 
21 to her to get this matter behind her and therefore, if you 
22 agree, we'll proceed with the sentencing. 
23 MR. MOFFAT: I certainly agree, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Basta, if you'll come 
25 forward with Counsel, please. 
17 
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Addendum D 
STATE OP UTAH 
DAVID MELDRUM 
Mr. Pusey: Your honor, Dave Meldrum. 
Your honor, I believe we have a disposition for Mr. Meldrum as 
well. It is my understanding that the State would be willing to 
move to amend the single count information to a Class A Attempted 
Unlawful Control of a trailer..urn to which Mr. Meldrum would enter 
a plea of No Contest, to be held in Abeyance for a period of one 
year. The proposed terms of the plea would be that he pay $150.00 
in costs and that he be on good behavior with probation to the 
Court. 
Judge: That would be the only terms of the Plea and Abeyance? 
A. That's my understanding, your honor. 
Judge: Mr. Shepherd is this your case? 
Mr. Delasandro: It's mine, your honor. 
Q. Why are we entering a No Contest on a theft case? 
Mr. Delasandro: Well, there's actually a couple of reasons. 
Chief among them is that Mr. Meldrum, regardless of his prior 
position, is still involved in several felony investigations, cases 
that are pending and our plan at this point is to continue to 
prosecute those cases and with Mr. Meldrum's cooperation. 
Judge: Are you telling me that a felony...that a misdemeanor 
plea would disable Mr. Meldrum from being a witness? 
A. No, but I think ah...it wouldn't disable him but with a No 
Contest plea it would less likely be used for impeachment purposes 
• Mis* 
I guess the thought is, your honor, is that he's an expert witness 
and would be subject to impeachment and No Contest will have to be 
collaterally established in a similar fashion to what happens here 
today. 
Judge: Well, if the plea is held in abeyance, wouldn't it have 
to be collaterally established anyway? 
A. I think it's the plea that is admissible, and it's admissible 
as to the impeachment as opposed to a (inaudible). 
Judge: Just an exception to heresy rule? It's a statement 
against interest, I guess, a declaration. Now, you're not 
suggesting however in asking me to take a No Contest plea in 
abeyance, Mr. Pusey, that in fact that the...that the incident did 
not occur which in fact your client did not in fact hook the 
trailer onto his truck and make a post-Miranda admission that he 
took it without permission? 
A. No. We're not making an alford plea, your Honor. 
Judge: O.K. It would be an accurate to state then...that my 
understanding is again both the Plea in Abeyance I suppose could be 
premised upon lack of prior criminal history but the plea in 
Abeyance, at least in part, as well as the No Contest plea is so 
that" Mr. Meldrum can in fact be more likely be able to testify as 
an expert witness in any pending cases, is that true? 
A. That's true. 
Court: Is Mr. Meldrum still employed in that same capacity? 
A. He is not, your honor. I don't know his employment status but 
he definitely has been terminated from this. 
Q. How many years? 
A. 17 years merit position. He's paid a due price for 
(inaudible) mistake he made, your Honor. 
Q: What happens to that 17 out of 20? Can't you just cash that 
out? 
A. Yea. 
Q. Is this like a recreational trailer? 
A. No# utility. 
Judge: With the understanding then the plea will be held in 
abeyance and not entered, Mr. Meldrum, how do you then plead 
to — is it a Class A then? Is it attempted? 
A. Attempted I believe. 
Judge: Attempted Unlawful Control of a motor vehicle, or 
trailer, during the date and at a place set forth in the 
Information, will it be guilty or No Contest? 
A. No Contest, your honor. 
Q. A No Contest plea is received but not entered. I'm going to 
direct the clerk of the Court to hold that No Contest plea in 
Abeyance for one year period of time. The conditions will be #1, 
your good behavior/ and #2, the payment of $150.00 court cost 
assessment. If we give you 30 days from today, Mr. Meldrum, is 
that enough time to pay the court cost? 
Meldrum: I'll just do it today. 
Judge: If you'll step to the counter then downstairs and write 
out that check right away to take care of it, that will clear the 
financial part of it. Thank you. 
Atty: Now, a year from now we'll be making appropriate motion 
to the Court to submit a copy to Mr. Delasandro. 
ooo i s? 
Addendum £ 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the 
offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause 
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to 
adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a 
continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information 
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery 
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is 
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make 
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be 
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continu-
ance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and 
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwritings 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of 
the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the 
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance 
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear 
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for 
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused 
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem 
appropriate. 
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CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MOFFATt 
Q. Mr. Meldrum, there's a document in front of you 
which you have been looking at. Can you tell me what it is? 
A. 
Q. 
This is the UFIRS report. 
Mr. Meldrum, the fire that destroyed the Basta home 
took place on February the 11th of 1995? 
A. 
Q. 
Marshall 
A. 
Q. 
of that 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And at that time, you were the Sandy City Fire 
» I 
Yes. 
And you had been the fire marshal for how long, as 
time? 
Five or six years. 1 
The charges against Betty were filed, say, late 
March, early April of 1995. Does that sound about right to 
you? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
against 
for the 
A. 
Q. 
They were filed the 6th of April. 
So early April of 1995? 
Yes. 
You knew at the time that the charges were filed 
Ms. Basta that you were going to be a material witness 
State in their prosecution of her? 
Yes. 
So you knew that on April the 6th? 
13 
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A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that the State of Utah was going to rely on 
you in making their case, or attempting to make their case 
against Ms. Basta? 
A. I knew that they would partly rely on me. 
Q. You were the person that did the initial fire scene 
inspection? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You're the one that took the first photos at the 
scene? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You inspected the wire that you had taken the 
pictures of? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. You were an important witness to them? 
A. I was a witness, yes. 
Q. An important one; isn't that right? 
A. I was a witness, yes. I don't how important. 
Q. You don't think you were an important witness? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You don't know? 
THE COURT: Counsel, whether he was important or 
not I think is a judgment to be made by prosecution, not by 
this witness. 
Q. (By Mr. Moffat) Mr. Meldrum, at the present time 
14 
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you're no longer the Sandy City Fire Marshal; are you? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You ceased being the Sandy City Fire Marshal 
sometime in May of 1995? 
A. That's right* 
Q. On April 26th of 1995, the charges against 
Ms. Basta had already been filed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were still the Sandy City Fire Marshal on April 
26th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were still a witness for the State? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the prosecution of Betty. And on April the 
26th/ you took a trailer from a job site that you were 
inspecting and doing code enforcement on; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it was a trailer that was being used by a crew 
that was at the construction site doing some kind of 
construction? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't ask their permission before you took the 
trailer? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You hooked it up on your truck and essentially drove 
15 
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away with it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. On April 28th of 1995, a police officer contacted 
you about that particular trailer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The crew had found you in possession of it and 
reported it stolen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Seen it attached to your truck? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The police questioned you that day about that 
trailer; didn't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You told them that you bought the trailer? 
A. I did. 
Q. You said that you saw it advertised in the 
classified ads, that it was on display at a restaurant, the 
Iceberg restaurant in West Jordan; isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You told them that the man was selling the trailer 
in the classified ads for $1,200? 
A. Yes. 
jQ. And that the trailer was displayed for sale 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 7200 South and 9th West? 
A. That's right. 
16 
1 Q. Now, when you told the police about how you got this 
2 trailer initially you — 
3 I MR. JONES: Objection, I don't see the relevance of 
4 this line of questioning. 
5 MR. MOFFAT: Your Honor, it goes directly to bias. 
6 THE COURT: Counsel, the witness has indicated that 
7 I he fabricated a story to the police officers. 
8 1 MR. MOFFAT: Okay. 
9 THE COURT: That's sufficient. 
10 MR. MOFFAT: All right. 
11 Q. (By Mr. Moffat) In addition to fabricating the 
12 story to the police officers, Mr. Meldrum, you gave them a 
13 fabricated receipt of sale for the trailer; isn't that right? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And the receipt was dated February 7th, 1995? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. All right. Now, these are police officers 
18 questioning you? 
19 A. Sure. 
20 I Q. You've been in law enforcement for how long? 
21 A. Since 1979. 
22 Q. 1979. You've been a police officer yourself; 
23 haven't you? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 I Q. These police officers are questioning you and you 
17 
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1 give them false documentation to support your story? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. The receipt said that, "For $1,000 I am selling a 
4 12-foot trailer to Dave Meldrum, no serial number, or title"; 
5 is that what It Indicates? 
6 I A. Something like that. 
7 1 Q. Would you like to see it? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. The receipt was signed by Mark Rierton? 
10 A. Right. 
11 Q. This was a complete fabrication; wasn't it? 
12 A. Yes, it was. 
13 Q. By you? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. In an effort to mislead the police about what had 
16 actually happened in this case? 
17 A. I suppose that's true, yes. 
18 Q. Now, you were charged with the crime, in the month 
19 of May, of theft; isn't that right? 
20 A. That's right. 
21 Q. And that was a third-degree felony? 
22 I A. I think so. 
23 J Q. And in your experience in law enforcement, third-
24 degree felonies are crimes that are punishable by the 
25 possibility of some prison time; isn't that right? 
18 
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A. Yes. 
Q. As for the time that you're charged, this case here 
Is still pending against Betty Basta; isn't it? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. You're still a witness -- is that a "yes"? 
A* Yes. 
Q. The State is still going to rely on you, in some 
fashion, to make its case against her? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The preliminary hearing in Ms. Basta's case had not 
even been held as of this time th*t you're charged; isn't that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You anticipate testifying in that preliminary 
hearing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The preliminary hearing happens in the month of 
June? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you appear at the preliminary hearing and you 
testify against Betty; don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In July, you go back to court In your case in Sandy? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Before Judge Livingston or Fuchs? 
19 
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A. Livingston, I think. 
Q. Livingston? And you go back to court and you're 
given a deal in your case by the District Attorney's office; 
isn't that right? 
A. I suppose so, yeah. 
Q. Now, the District Attorney's office — this is the 
Salt Lake District Attorney's office; isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's the same governmental entity that Mr. Jones 
works for? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It's the same governmental entity that is 
prosecuting the case against Betty Basta? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It's the same entity that's relying on you, in some 
fashion, to prosecute and make its case against Ms. Basta? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The District Attorney's office gives you a deal and 
allows you to plead no contest to a class A misdemeanor; is 
that right? 
A. Through my attorney, they did, yes. 
Q. That offer was extended to you? 
A. Through my attorney, yes. 
Q. They offered that deal to your attorney? 
A. I had no contact with them whatsoever. 
20 
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Q. That offer was made to your attorney? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And the offer was then extended to you? 
A* That's right. 
Q. That offer did away with the felony charge against 
you; did it not? 
A. It did. 
Q. You're no longer facing prison time; isn't that 
correct? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Pled to a misdemeanor, no contest; is that right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. In addition to that# Mr. Meldrum, this plea was — 
it was agreed among the parties that the plea would be held by 
Judge Livingston in abeyance; wasn't it? 
A. I have no idea. My attorney handled all of that. I 
had no contact. 
Q. Your attorney discussed the plea with you; didn't 
he? 
A. He did. 
Q. He wanted to make sure that in entering the plea 
that you knew exactly what the plea was; isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you — before you entered the plea, you wanted 
to know everything about the plea because you were going to be 
21 
directly affected by it; isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew at the time that you entered the plea that 
the plea was not going to be recorded as a conviction; isn't 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that the plea — that means that you would 
never — strike that* The plea would be dismissed by the 
judge and there would be no record at all, if certain things 
occurred? 
A. That's right* 
Q. When you testified against Betty at the preliminary 
hearing, you hadn't had this deal yet; isn't that right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. They hadn't extended this offer to you? 
A. No. 
Q. You knew if you testified against her in a way that 
would help the State make its case, that you might receive 
some favorable treatment, such as this deal from the District 
Attorney's office; isn't that right? 
A. Counsel, that's ludicrous. 
Q* It's ludicrous? 
A. It's offensive. 
Q. You've been in law enforcement for 16 years? 
A. That's r ight . 
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Q. You're familiar with the laws? 
A. I am. 
Q. You're familiar with how cases are screened and 
filed; aren't you? 
A. I am. 
Q. You've done that yourself, you screened cases with 
the District Attorney's office to be filed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In your case, you were charged only with the third-
degree felony; isn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Clearly, Mr. Meldrum, you could have been charged 
with other counts; isn't that correct? 
A. I don't think so. 
MR. JONES: How would he know that, Your Honor? 
MR. MOFFAT: May I approach, Judge? 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I'm not persuaded this 
witness is qualified on the foundation before us at this time, 
simply because he's been an officer of the law, that he could 
have been charged with more than what he was charged. We 
dealt here with what he was charged with and the circumstances 
underlying. And, therefore, I'm going to sustain the 
objection that there's no foundation. 
Q. (By Mr. Moffat) Mr. Meldrum, you weren't charged 
with the offense of tampering with evidence? 
23 
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1 A. I already told you I was charged with one charge. 
2 1 Q. So you weren't charged with the charge of tampering 
3 with evidence? 
4 1 A. I was charged with one charge, theft of the trailer. 
5 Q. You're familiar with the charge "tampering with 
6 evidence1'; are you not? 
7 A. No, not at all. 
8 Q. You've never encountered it in your 15 years of law 
9 enforcement? 
10 A. Never. 
11 Q. You weren't charged with the crime of giving false 
12 information to a police officer; were you? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Clearly, you gave false information to the police?. 
15 A. Yes, I did. 
16 Q. Yet you weren't charged with that particular — 
17 MR. JONES: He's answered that, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: He has answered that. Sustained. 
19 Q. (By Mr. Moffat) You wouldn't want the District 
20 Attorney's office to file those charges against you; would 
21 you? 
22 I A. At the time that this happened, it was up to the 
23 District Attorney's office to do whatever they wanted. 
24 Q. You wouldn't want the District Attorney's office to 
25 file tampering with evidence — 
24 
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1 MR. JONES: It isn't relevant* 
2 THE COURT: Objection is sustained. Counsel, he's 
3 told you what the arrangement was, what he pled to, and the 
4 underlying facts regarding that circumstances. And his 
5 druthers in the situation are irrelevant, at least at the time 
6 of the charge. Objection sustained. 
7 I Q. (By Mr. Moffat) You wouldn't want those charges to 
8 be filed against you now? 
9 MR. JONES: Judge, that's the same question* 
10 MR. MOFFAT: Judge, his — 
11 THE COURT: The witness may answer that question. 
12 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, what was the question? 
13 THE COURT: Would you want the charges to be filed 
14 j against you now? 
15 THE WITNESS: No. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 Q. (By Mr. Moffat) Clearly, they could be filed 
18 against you, couldn't they, Mr. Meldrum? 
19 I A. I have no idea, I don't think so. This case has 
20 I been adjudicated. 
21 I Q. Isn't it true that you're testifying against 
22 I Ms. Basta to make sure that something like that doesn't happen 
23 in this particular case? 
24 I A* Of course that's not true. Again, that's really 
25 offensive. 
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Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
plea to 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
offered 
A. 
was that 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
that you 
A. 
Q. 
to your 
Your plea has been held in abeyance for a year? 1 
Yes. 
The plea can be dismissed? 
Yes. 
You're to cooperate with the State as part of your 
make sure that the charges are dismissed? 1 
Absolutely not. 
It's not true? 
Absolutely not true. 
You see no connection between the deal that you were 
and your testimony in this case, Mr. Meldrum? 
Your question was whether or not part of the deal 
. I was to cooperate with the State. 
Do you see any connection Mr. Meldrum — 
I do not. 
— between your testimony in this case and the deal 1 
i received? 
None whatsoever. 
Do you see any connection, Mr. Meldrum, in respect 
testimony in this case and the charges against you 
being dismissed outright? 
A. 
Q. 
Absolutely not. 
When the charges are dismissed outright against you, 
Mr. Meldrum, you will have no record of conviction in your 
case; isn't that right? 
26 
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A. Yes. 
Q. There will be no record that the case ever happened; 
isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. It's a pretty good deal; is that correct, 
Mr. Meldrum? 
A. I thought it was. I thought it was fair. 
Q. Mr. Meldrum# you've testified and indicated that you 
had certain training in the field of fire investigation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you indicated that you had offered certain 
publications — or articles for publication? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you please tell me the name of both articles? 
A. The first one — the first one that was written was 
a public study, and I think that I titled it, "A Public Study 
of Arson and Public Awareness," or something like that. 
Q. When was this article written? 
A. It was written in '82. 
Q. Where was it published? 
A. National Fire Academy. 
Q. And the name of the article was "A Public Study of 
Arson," and what was it? 
A. Public Awareness. "Public Awareness of Arson and 
Fire." 
27 
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1 intentionally set fire, no accident, and it starts in the 
2 I family room. 
3 Well, finally, we heard from the Defense expert, 
4 and there are a couple of things that I think are troubling 
5 I about Dave Smith's testimony. Oh, great credentials, great 
6 credentials for this man who claims that he investigated more 
7 than 6,000 fires. He's paid $2,000 to come in here and 
8 testify for the Defense. He only relies on what somebody 
9 else has already done to do his investigation. He admitted 
10 that some of the experts don't agree that that's the way you 
11 investigate. In fact, I put Dave Meldrum back on the stand 
12 and I said, "Have you ever heard of such a thing that some-
13 body can reach a conclusion as to cause and origin simply by 
14 looking at somebody else's photographs? 
15 Boy, wouldn't that be nice? I wish we could solve 
16 all of our crimes by looking at somebody else's photographs. 
17 Mr. Meldrum said, "No, I've never heard of that 
18 being done," and Mr. Smith admitted it on the stand that not 
19 all of the experts in the field agree that that's the best 
20 way to investigate an arson case. Oh, yes, the pictures 
21 help, but the best way to investigate arson is to go to the 
22 scene and get there, take a look at the fire scene, take a 
23 look at the depth of char. 
24 I I mean, I thought it was amazing when Mr. Smith 
25 I told you that he can determine the depth of char by simply 
IV: 24 
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1 looking at the photographs. Well, Mr. Meldrum said no, you 
2 can't do that, and in fact, I read an article to Mr. Smith. 
3 I said, HSome of the other experts in the field say you can-
4. not determine the depth of char by simply looking at a photo-
5 graph," and he acknowledged that. He didn't agree with it, 
6 but he said that's the situation. 
7 Well, members of the jury, I submit Mr. Smith is 
8 wrong in his analysis of this case and that the other three 
9 experts aire correct, but again, I say to you, I don't know 
10 that you need to get into a struggle trying to decide who do 
11 you believe because if you want to set aside all four 
12 experts, that testimony of Mr. Durrant, Dave Durrant, is 
13 extremely compelling when we start talking about where this 
14 fire originated and how it was started. 
15 Just one other thing that I wanted to talk to you 
16 about. As you know, there are two charges in this case, one 
17 for insurance fraud and the other for the aggravated arson. 
18 In reality this is what you would call an all or nothing 
19 case. If you conclude that Mrs. Basta set the fire, then 
20 simply submitting the proof of loss to the insurance company 
21 is fraudulent. In fact, I think Mr. Howard told you that. 
22 if she -set the fire, would she be entitled to any insurance? 
23 He said absolutely not. 
24 If you conclude, on the other hand, though, that 
25 she did not set the fire, then submitting the claim is not 
IV:25 
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1 Next, the Defense said, well, the reason you can't 
2 believe Mr. Meldrum is he's got an interest in the outcome of 
3 the case. He does? Did he get $2,000 to come in and testify 
4 like Mr. Smith? I mean, here's a man who's no longer in the 
5 fire department. He could have just said, hey, forget it, 
6 forget it, I'm no longer there, I don't really care, but the 
7 fact that Dave Meldrum comes in here and testifies and tells 
8 you the same thing that he concluded back in February says 
9 something about his integrity. It says something about the 
10 man. That was his call to make. That was his conclusion. 
11 THE COURT: Two minutes, Mr. Jones. 
12 MR. JONES: You know, then the Defense start pick-
13 ing on some of the statements in the report. In Mr. Peak's 
14 report he puts down that the wall or that the fire originated 
15 on or near the west wall. Okay. That's what it says in the 
16 report, but if you remember, we specifically asked Mr. Peak, 
17 "Mr. Peak, when you say on or near the west wall, are you 
18 telling us that the fire started inside that wall in the 
19 electrical system?" 
20 He said, "Absolutely not. I'm telling you that the 
21 fire started in the area that I've marked here on the 
22 diagram." 
23 You know, we're playing a little game here with 
24 words, at least the Defense is, trying to, when they try to 
25 suggest to you that Mr. Peak concluded that the fire started 
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